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Abstract. [Context] Many security risk assessment methods are pro-
posed both in academia (typically with a graphical notation) and indus-
try (typically with a tabular notation). [Question] We compare methods
based on those two notations with respect to their actual and perceived
efficacy when both groups are equipped with a domain-specific security
catalogue (as typically available in industry risk assessments).
[Results] Two controlled experiments with MSc students in computer
science show that tabular and graphical methods are (statistically) equiv-
alent in quality of identified threats and security controls. In the first
experiment the perceived efficacy of tabular method was slightly better
than the graphical one, and in the second experiment two methods are
perceived as equivalent. [Contribution] A graphical notation does not
warrant by itself better (security) requirements elicitation than a tabular
notation in terms of the quality of actually identified requirements.
Keywords: security risk assessment method; empirical study; controlled exper-
iment; method evaluation model; equivalence testing
1 Introduction
Risk analysis is an essential step to deliver secure software systems. It is used to
identify security requirements, to look for flaws in the software architecture that
would allow attacks to succeed, and to prioritize tests during test execution.
Problem. An interesting observation is that there is a difference in notation
between academic proposals and industry standards for security risk assessment
(SRA). Most academic approaches suggest a graphical notation, starting from
the seminal work on Anti-Goals [1] to [2] and more recently [3]. Industry opts
for tabular models like OCTAVE [4], ISO 27005 and NIST 800-30. Microsoft
STRIDE [5] is the exception on the industry side and SREP [6] is the exception
on the academic side.
The initial goal of our long term experimental plan in 2011 [7] was to empir-
ically prove that (academic) SRA methods using a graphical notation (for short
“graphical methods”) were indeed superior to risk assessment methods using a
tabular notation (for short “tabular methods”). We struggled to prove differ-
ence in our previous experiments [8,9], then maybe we should prove equivalence.
Thus, our study aims to answer the following research questions (RQs):
RQ1 Are tabular and graphical SRA methods equivalent w.r.t. actual efficacy?
RQ2 Are tabular and graphical SRA methods equivalent w.r.t. perceived effi-
cacy?
Approach. We ran two controlled experiments with 35 and 48 MSc students
who worked in groups of two participants. They applied both methods to four
different security tasks (i.e. 2 tasks per each method) for a large scale assess-
ment lasting 8 weeks. In the first experiment groups analyzed security tasks for
the Remotely Operated Tower (ROT) for Air Traffic Management (ATM). To
prevent plagiarism between two experiments, in the second experiment we asked
groups to perform the same security tasks but for a different ATM scenario,
namely Unmanned Aerial System Traffic Management (UTM).
We measured actual efficacy as the quality of threats and security controls
identified with a method as rated by domain-experts. Perceived efficacy is mea-
sured in terms of perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PU)
of the methods through a post-task questionnaire administered to participants.
The independent variables were methods and security tasks to assess.
A key difference with our previous studies (e.g. [10]) is that we provided
to both groups a industry catalogue with hundreds of domain-specific threats
and security controls. In this setting, using the number of identified threats and
control as a measure of quality (as we did in our first study [10]) would have been
inappropriate as anybody could obtain a large number of (potentially irrelevant)
threats or controls just by looking up into the catalogue. So we employed several
domain security experts to rate the result of the students.
We also replaced the academic tabular method SREP [6] which we used in [10]
by a method used in the industry SecRAM [11] which had very similar tables
but a nimbler process, designed by risk-assessment industry experts to simplify
the risk assessment process, in the same fashion that the graphical method was
designed by SINTEF to be simple to use in its industry consultancies [3].
Key Findings and Contribution. Our main findings — as unpalatable as
they might be — are that, given the same conditions, the tabular and graphical
methods are equivalent to each other with respect to the actual and perceived
efficacy. Both results are statistically significant when compared with two one-
sided tests (TOST) [12,13] which allows for testing for equivalence of outcomes.
Our study shows that representation by itself is not enough to warrant the
superiority of a graphical model over a tabular model. Translating this result to
general requirements engineering would mean that the fancy graphics of i* [14]
and its many offsprings, are equivalent to the plain tables of Volere [15].
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2 Background and Related Work
From an academic perspective, we have seen a significant development in require-
ments engineering towards graphical methods to identify security requirements.
Some were backed up by formal reasoning capabilities [1,2], others offered vari-
ants of graphical notation [16,17,18,3], or minimal model based transformation
analysis [19]. An epiphenomena of this trend was the RE’15 most influential pa-
per award to the RE’05 paper introducing a graphical notation and sophisticated
reasoning capabilities to verify security properties [2].
In contrast, industry standard development bodies doggedly use tabular rep-
resentations for the elicitation of threats and security requirements. NIST 800-30
and ISO 27005 standards both use tables. Domain specific methodologies such
as SecRAM [11], designed for risk assessment in ATM, also use tables. Most of
tables use essentially the same wordings, with major differences being mostly on
the process (some suggesting to analyze threats first, others suggesting to start
the analysis from assets). Such preference could be due to simplicity, or the need
to produce the documentation (in forms of table) that is often need to achieve
compliance (as opposed to actual security).
As mentioned, our research goal since 2011 [7] has been to prove that graph-
ical methods were actually superior to tabular methods. In all our experiments,
in order to make the comparison fair, the difference between the methods was
purely in the notation and the accompanying modeling process: graphical no-
tation on one side, tabular on the other side. The formal reasoning capabilities
supported by some methods [2] were never called into play.
This was never considered to be a problem, as the RE trend since 2005 has
“revealed the emergence of new techniques to visualize and animate require-
ments models [. . . ] beautifully simple but potentially very effective” [20]. Such
folk knowledge assumes that a graphical RE model would be anyhow better.
This seemed to be partly confirmed by our initial experiment in 2013 [10]. Yet,
our other experiments failed to produce strong, conclusive evidence in this re-
spect [9,8].
The literature suggests that tabular methods support better the identifica-
tion of threats and security requirements than graphical methods. Opdahl and
Sindre [21] compared misuse cases with attack trees in a controlled experiment
with students and repeated it with industrial practitioners in [22]. Both studies
showed that attack trees help to identify more threats than misuse cases, but
both methods have similar perception. St˚alhane et al. have conducted a series
of experiments to evaluate two representations of misuse cases: a graphical dia-
gram and a textual template. The results reported in [23] revealed that textual
use cases helped to identify more threats than use-case diagrams. In more re-
cent experiments [24,25,26], St˚alhane et al. compared textual misuse cases with
UML system sequence diagrams. The results showed that textual misuse cases
are better than sequence diagrams in identification of threats related to required
functionality or user behavior. In contrast, sequence diagrams outperform tex-
tual use cases in the identification of threats related to the system’s internal
working. Scandariato et al. [27] evaluated Microsoft STRIDE [5], which is is
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a mix of graphical (Data Flow Diagrams) and tabular notations. The results
showed that STRIDE is not perceived as difficult by the participants but their
productivity in threats identified per hour was very low. Besides, the correct-
ness of the threat is good because the participants identified only few incorrect
threats but the completeness was low because they overlook many threats.
3 Research Design
To answer our research questions we cannot use the approach used in the previous
papers [10,9,8] as they attempted to prove difference and the lack of evidence for
difference is not the same as evidence for equivalence. Hence, we use equivalence
testing – TOST, which was initially proposed by Schuirmann [12] and is widely
used in pharmacological and food sciences to answer the question whether two
treatments are equivalent within a particular range δ [28,13]. We summarize the
key aspects of TOST as it is not well known in SE and refer to [13] for details.
The problem of the equivalence test can be formulated as follows:
H0 : |µA − µB | > δ vs Ha : |µA − µB | ≤ δ. (1)
where µA and µB are means of methods A and B, and δ corresponds to the
range within which we consider two methods to be equivalent.
Such question can be tested as a combination of two tests, as:
H01 : µA < µB − δ or H02 : µA > µB + δ
Ha1 : µA ≥ µB − δ and Ha2 : µA ≤ µB + δ, (2)
The p-value is then the maximum among p-values of the two tests (see [13]
for an explanation on why it is not necessary to perform a Bonferroni-Holms
correction). The underlaying statistical test for each of these two alternative
hypothesis can then be any difference tests (eg. t-test, Wilcoxon, Mann-Whitney
etc.) as appropriate to the underlying data.
For variables collected along a 1-5 Likert scale, a percentage test [28] may
grant statistical equivalence too easily and, therefore, we ran an absolute test
with narrower range of δ = ±0.6. A statistical difference would then correspond
to a clear practical difference: a gap in the perception of two methods bigger than
> 0.6 means that around 2/3 of participants ranked one method at least one
point higher than the rank of the other method. For the qualitative evaluation
of the security assessment by the experts it means that, e.g., two out of three
experts gave one point higher to SRA performed with one method comparing to
the results of the other method. It corresponds to 20% range on a 5-item scale
with mean value equal to 3.
Study Design and Planning. We chose a within-subject design where each
group applied both methods. To avoid limitations due to domain security knowl-
edge, each group was also given a professional-level domain-specific catalogue (its
effects are described in [29]). To avoid learning effects, each group was asked to
perform the risk assessment for a different security task in the same domain.
Table 1 summarizes the treatment variables that we used in our study.
In our study each group performed the risk analysis of four security tasks
(see Table 1). To control the effect of security tasks on results we split groups
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Table 1: Experimental Variables
As treatments we had two methods, four security tasks, and two experiments. As dependent variables
we had quality of threats and security control as a measure of actual efficacy, and PEOU and PU as
a measure of method’s perception.
Type Name Description
Treatment Tabular, Graphical The method used to conduct SRA for a security task: SESAR
SecRAM (Tabular) or CORAS (Graphical).
IM, AM, WebApp/DB,
and Network
The groups have to conduct SRA for each of four security
tasks: 1) Identity Management (IM) and 2) Access Manage-
ment (AM) Security, 3) Web Application and Database Secu-
rity (WebApp/DB), and 1) Network and Infrastructural Se-
curity (Network).
Experiment X The study consisted of two controlled experiments: Experi-
ment 1 and Experiment 2.
Actual
Efficacy
QT , QSC The overall quality of threats (QT ) and security controls
(QSC) based on the evaluation from three independent se-
curity experts.
Perceived
Efficacy
PEOU, PU Mean of the responses to the eight questions about perceived
ease of use (PEOU) and nine questions about perceived use-
fulness (PU).
into two types: type A groups started by using the graphical method on IM, then
the tabular method on AM and so on, alternating methods, while type B groups
did the opposite. Each group was randomly assigned to either type A or B.
Experimental Protocol. Our protocol consists of three main phases:
Training. Participants were administered a short demographics and background
questionnaire. For each SRA method and application scenario participants at-
tended 2h lecture given by an author of the paper. Each lecture on method
was followed by a practical exercise on a toy scenario demonstrating applica-
tion of the corresponding method. After, participants were divided in groups of
two and received training materials including EUROCONTROL EATM security
catalogues and scenario description. Since catalogues and ROT description are
confidential materials for EUROCONTROL, participants received only a paper
version of the documents and had to sign a non-disclosure agreement.
Application. Once trained on the scenario and methods, groups had to apply
each method to four different tasks (two per method). For each task, groups:
- Attended a two hours lecture on the threats and possible security controls
specific to the task but not specific to the scenario.
- Had 2 weeks to apply the assigned methods to identify threats and security
controls specific for the task.
- Delivered an intermediate report.
- Gave a short presentation about the preliminary results of the method ap-
plication and received feedback from one of the authors of this paper.
Evaluation. Three experts independently evaluated the quality of threats and
security controls identified by groups and the overall quality of the report, pro-
viding marks and justifications. Participants received experts’ assessments and
the course final mark. After, they were asked to answer the post-task question-
naire to collect their perception of the methods taking into account the feedback.
Data Collection. Table 1 reports dependent variables for actual and per-
ceived efficacy. To answer RQ1 we measured a method’s actual efficacy by ask-
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ing external security experts to independently evaluate the quality of identified
threats and security controls for each security task on a five-item scale: Bad
(1), Poor (2), Fair (3), Good (4), and Excellent (5). Such choice is motivated
by several factors. At first, the quality of results is considered to be more im-
portant in practice: “the security risk assessment report is expected to contain
adequate and relevant evidence to support its findings, clear and relevant recom-
mendations” [30] (Our emphasis). Second, as all participants were provided with
a catalogues, they could easily produce a large number of threats and control,
irrespective of the method used. Further, [21] have also reported that different
methods might help to generate outcomes of difference quality: participants us-
ing attack trees identified mainly generic threats, while misuse cases helped to
identify more domain-specific threats.
To answer RQ2 we collected participants’ opinion PEOU and PU of both
methods using a post-task questionnaire at the very end of our study. The post-
task questionnaire was inspired by the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [31]
and a similar questionnaire used in [21,9]. The questions were formulated in one
sentence with answers on a 5-point Likert scale (1 - Strongly agree; 2 - Agree; 3
- Not certain; 4 - Agree; 5 - Strongly agree)3.
In [10,9] we used raw responses to individual questions within each category
to compare PEOU and PU of two methods. Karpati et al. [22] used the mean of
participants’ responses to PEOU and PU questions as a consolidated measure
of their PEOU and PU. The approach by Karpati et al. seems to be more ro-
bust against the possible fluctuation of the responses within the same category.
Therefore, in the current study we adopted this approach.
Data Analysis. To test for statistical difference, we used the following un-
derlying non-parametric tests for difference as our data is ordinal and not normal:
– Mann-Whitney (MW) test to compare two unpaired groups (eg. quality of
threats in two experiments).
– Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare two paired groups (eg. participants’
perception of two methods).
– Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test to compare more than two unpaired groups (eg.
quality of threats in four security tasks).
– Spearman’s rho coefficient for correlation.
For the hypotheses about equivalence of two treatments we applied TOST with
Wilcoxon test as the underlying test. The TOST and selection of the equiva-
lence range is discussed in Section 3. For all statistical test we adopted 5% as a
threshold for α (i.e. probability of committing Type-I error) [32].
4 Study Realization
The study consisted of two controlled experiments: Experiment 1 and 2. The
participants of the study were MSc students enrolled to Security Engineering
course taught by one of the author in Fall semesters of 2014-2015 and 2015-2016
3 To prevent participants from “auto-pilot” answering, a half of the questions were
given in a positive statement and another half in a negative statement.
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Table 2: Overall participants’ Demographic Statistics
Experiment 1
Variable Scale Mean/
Median
Distribution
Age Years 23.1 43.3% were 19-22 years old; 43.3% were 23-25
years old; 13.3% were 26-31 years old
Gender Sex 75.8% male; 24.2% female
Work Experience — 1.3 46.7% had no experience; 36.7% had 1-2 years;
13.3% had 3-5 years; 3.3% had 6 years
Expertise in Security 0(Novice)-
4(Expert)
1 (median) 26.7% novices; 60% beginners; 13.3% competent
users
Expertise in Modeling
Languages
— 1 (median) 26.7% novices; 26.7% beginners; 40% competent
users; 6.7% proficient users
Expertise in ATM — 0 (median) 93.3% novices; 6.7% beginners
Experiment 2
Variable Scale Mean/
Median
Distribution
Age Years 24.4 32.6% were 21-22 years old; 34.9% were 23-25
years old; 32.6% were 26-30 years old
Gender Sex 78.3% male; 21.7% female
Work Experience — 2.1 23.3% had no experience; 44.2% had 1-2 years;
23.3% had 3-5 years; 9.3% had 6-10 years
Expertise in Security 0(Novice)-
4(Expert)
1 (median) 30.2% novices; 41.9% beginners; 11.6% compe-
tent users; 11.6% proficient users; 4.7% experts
Expertise in Modeling
Languages
— 1 (median) 11.6% novices; 41.9% beginners; 30.2% compe-
tent users; 16.3% proficient users
Expertise in ATM — 0 (median) 69.8% novices; 27.9% beginners; 2.3% compe-
tent users
academic years at the University of Trento, Italy. Experiments involved 35 and
48 participants correspondingly. Participants worked in groups of 2 members,
except one participant in Experiment 1 who did not have a partner. We had to
discard the results from 5 participants in Experiment 1 and 2 participants in
Experiment 2 because they failed to complete all necessary steps of the study
or provide inconsistent responses to a post-task questionnaire. If the problem
was only with post-task questionnaire, we discarded the results only from RQ2
analysis and kept the group’s results in the analysis for RQ1.
Table 2 reports participants’ demographics in Experiment 1 (above) and 2
(below). A half of the participants (53.3%) in Experiment 1 and most partici-
pants (76.7%) in Experiment 2 reported that they had working experience. In
Experiment 1 the participants had basic knowledge of security, while in Exper-
iment 2 the participants reported good general knowledge of security. In both
experiments the participants had basic knowledge of modeling languages and
limited background in the application scenario.
Application Scenario Selection. In Experiment 1 as an application sce-
nario we selected the Remotely Operated Tower (ROT) which was developed for
and used in our previous study [29]. ROT is a new operational concept proposed
by SESAR in order to optimize the air traffic management in the small and
remote airports. The main idea is that control tower operators will no longer be
located at the airport. The air traffic controllers will use a graphical reproduc-
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tion of the out-of-the-window view by means of cameras with a 360-degree view
which overlaid with information from other sources like surface movement radar,
surveillance radar, and others. The first implementation of ROT has been done
by LFV and Saab in Sweden in 2015 4.
To control the possible “learning effects” between different experiments, in
Experiment 2 we switched to the application scenario on the Unmanned Aerial
System Traffic Management (UTM) based on the documents from NASA [33],
Amazon’s memorandum for commercial interests [34], and the thesis on the
integration of drones into the national aerospace system [35].
Tasks. For both application scenarios we asked our groups to conduct SRA
for each security task (see Table 1) using the corresponding method according
to the predefined order. For example, in WebApp/DB task they could identify
threats like SQL injection or DoS attack and propose controls to mitigate them.
Methods Selection. In this study we continued our work reported in [10,9].
Thus, as an instance of graphical method we kept CORAS method a) in order to
have a common point of comparison with the previous studies and b) because it
provides a clear process to conduct SRA. CORAS was design by SINTEF [3], a
research institution in Norway. They use this method to provide consulting ser-
vices to their clients. CORAS is a graphical method whose analysis is supported
by a set of diagrams that represent assets, threats, risks and treatments. This
method supports both the ISO 27005 and ISO 31000 standards.
In contrast to [9], as a tabular methods we selected another ATM Security
Risk Assessment Method (SecRAM) proposed by SESAR. The method was de-
veloped within project 16.02.03 [11], and used by professionals in the SESAR
program to conduct SRA. This method was designed as an easy to use step-wise
method that can be applied to any operational focus ares of SESAR. Which
means that its process should be clearer comparing to EUROCONTROL Se-
cRAM’s process. Further when we use SecRAM we refer to SESAR SecRAM
unless otherwise stated.
5 Results
In the following, we report results of our study, with the aim of answering the
research questions formulated in Section 3.
First, we performed an analysis on the various experimental factors (i.e.
experiments and tasks) to determine whether there was a significant difference.
Factors without a significant difference in outcomes were aggregated, whereas
outcomes for factors with a significant difference were reported separately.
Factor - Security Task: The results of pairwise TOST with Wilcoxon test
confirmed the equivalence of each pair of tasks for the quality of threats (p-
value< 0.021 in Exp. 1 and p-value< 0.002 in Exp. 2) and controls (p-value<
0.004 in Exp. 1 and p-value< 2∗10−5 in Exp. 2). Therefore, we can use the mean
quality of threats and controls identified for two tasks as a measure of actual
4 LFV: RTS - One Year In Operation. Available: http://news.cision.com/lfv/r/
rts---one-year-in-operation,c9930962
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The figures report experts overall quality assessment of the threats and controls identified for four
security tasks in Experiment 1 (left) and 2 (right). The majority of the groups delivered threats and
controls of “fair” and “good” quality. Only limited number of the reports delivered “poor” threats
and security controls. The quality of the results was better than previous experiments [9] and we
did not split groups into “good” and “bad”.
Fig. 1: Experts assessment by methods and experiments
efficacy for a method. In this way we can eliminate a possible effect of task order
on the results of Wilcoxon test and compare paired data.
Factor - Experiment: The results of TOST confirmed the equivalence of two
experiments for the mean quality of threats and controls for both methods
(TOST p-value < 0.005). However, TOST failed to reject the hypothesis about
non-equivalence of two experiments for the mean participants’ PEOU (TOST
p-value = 0.21) and PU (TOST p-value = 0.07) for graphical method. Hence,
we report the results of the two experiments separately.
Factor - Background: In both experiments the KW test did not revealed any
statistically significant effect of background variables (see Table 2) on the quality
of threats and controls or mean participants’ PEOU and PU.
RQ1: Actual Efficacy. Figure 1 reports the mean of experts assessment of
threats and security controls identified by groups. In Experiment 1 and 2 we
had 18 and respectively 24 groups that successfully delivered the final report
and were evaluated by the experts. In total we collected 72 methods applications
in Experiment 1 and 96 in Experiment 2. The overall quality of the identified
threats and security controls was “fair” or “good”.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics, p-values of the TOST with Wilcoxon
test for the equivalence in the mean quality of threats and controls by experi-
ment and method. In Experiment 1 tabular method helped to identify threats
and controls of a slightly better quality than the graphical one and in Experiment
2 both methods helped to produce results of the same quality. However, in both
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Table 3: Average quality of threats and sec. controls by experiments and methods
Tabular and graphical methods produces very similar quality of threats and controls in both experi-
ments. The quality of the produced threat is within a 10% range around the mean quality range (3 -
fair). For both experiments this is statistically significant with a TOST for an effect size of δ = ±0.6
corresponding to less than two experts having a different rate of the outcome of the risk assessment.
Actual Tabular Graphical δmean TOST
Efficacy Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. Tab - Graph p-value
Exp. 1 Threats 3.17 3.08 0.53 2.95 2.92 0.53 +0.22 0.0009
Sec. Ctrls 3.28 3.25 0.53 2.97 2.92 0.51 +0.31 0.001
Exp. 2 Threats 3.28 3.17 0.58 3.24 3.17 0.57 +0.04 6.3 · 10−6
Sec. Ctrls 3.31 3.25 0.67 3.29 3.25 0.62 +0.02 2.4 · 10−7
Table 4: Average perception of tabular and graphical SRA methods
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the participants reported higher PEOU and PU for the
tabular method than for the graphical one. However, TOST (δ = ±0.6) results did not reveal any
equivalence of two methods and Wilcoxon results did not confirm that the difference is statistically
significant. The results of Experiment 2 revealed that two methods are equivalent with respect to
PEOU (statistically significant with a TOST for an effect size of δ = ±0.6).
Perceived Tabular Graphical δmean TOST
Efficacy Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. Tab - Graph p-value
Exp.1 PEOU 3.63 3.75 0.59 3.20 3.12 0.64 +0.43 0.08
PU 3.54 3.72 0.84 3.05 3.17 0.83 +0.37 0.18
Exp. 2 PEOU 3.74 3.75 0.40 3.60 3.69 0.71 +0.14 2.6 · 10−5
PU 3.67 3.78 0.58 3.29 3.44 0.99 +0.38 0.03
experiments the TOST results confirmed that the two methods are equivalent in
threats and controls quality.
RQ2: Perceived Efficacy. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics, p-values of
TOST with Wilcoxon test for the equivalence in participants’ PEOU and PU by
experiment and method. In Experiment 1 the participants reported better per-
ception of the tabular model over the graphical one for all three variables. Such
difference in mean was lower than our TOST practical significance threshold of
δ = ±0.6. TOST failed to reject the hypotheses about non-equivalence between
two methods for PEOU and PU. In Experiment 2 we have different picture. The
perception of the graphical method significantly increased in this experiment
comparing to the first one. So, the two methods have equivalent PEOU and PU
which confirmed by TOST results.
6 Retrospective Analysis
In the previous studies [10,9] we compared graphical method CORAS with differ-
ent tabular methods. In [10] as a tabular method we chose SREP [6] proposed by
University of Castilla–La Mancha and used by CMU Software Engineering Insti-
tute in their tutorials. The participants worked in groups of two and conducted
SRA of four security tasks from SmartGrid scenario using both methods. The
division of groups on good and “not good” was done based on security experts
assessment of the final reports quality. In [9] we used tabular method from in-
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dustry proposed by EUROCONTROL, SecRAM. The participants individually
conducted SRA of two tasks from SmartGrid scenario using both methods.
In [10,9] we followed the approach by Opdahl and Karpati [21] and used the
number of threats and security controls identified using a method as a measure
of the actual efficacy. Thus, we cannot compare current results with the results
reported in [10,9], but this comparison can be done for the perception variables.
We re-ran hypothesis testing for the equivalence of two methods in partici-
pants’ PEOU and PU using TOST with MW test. We chose MW test to have
comparable results across all experiments as we cannot used Wilcoxon test when
we analyze the results of good groups where the samples can be unpaired.
The results of the retrospective analysis do not contradict to the results
reported in the first study [10]. For good groups TOST failed to reject the
hypothesis about non-equivalence in mean PEOU (p-value= 0.25) and PU (p-
value= 0.27). Across all groups TOST results confirmed the equivalence of two
methods w.r.t. mean PEOU (p-value = 0.051) and PU (p-value = 0.003).
For the second study [9] the retrospective analysis for all participants re-
vealed: a) 10% significantly better mean PEOU in favor of graphical method
(MW p-value = 0.06) and b) 10% significant equivalence in mean PU between
two methods (TOST p-value = 0.08). For good participants TOST failed to re-
ject hypothesis about non-equivalence of two methods in mean PEOU (p-value
= 0.85) and PU (p-value = 0.43). Slightly better PEOU of the graphical method
might be because its process is clearer comparing to the process of the tabular
method as suggested by the qualitative analysis results (see Table III in [9]).
The difference between the results reported for the perception in [9] and the
results of the retrospective analysis can be due to the different data collection
approach which is discussed in Section 3.
7 Discussion
The results showed in both experiments that two methods are equally good in
terms of quality of identified threats and controls. Thus, in response to RQ1 we
can conclude that tabular and graphical methods are equal w.r.t. actual efficacy.
In Experiment 1 we observed slightly better participants’ PEOU and PU, but
the results failed to reveal any statistically significant equivalence or difference
between two methods in these variables. At the same time, in Experiment 2
tabular and graphical methods were found to be statistically equivalent in terms
of participants’ PEOU and PU. The possible explanation is that in Experiment
1 we used the ROT scenario that was designed by the same organization which
designed tabular method and security catalogues. Possible this combination is a
“good fit” which led to better perception of the tabular method. In Experiment
2 we used UATM scenario by NASA that might be “not a good fit” to the same
combination of tabular method and security catalogues. This could result in a
similar perceived ease of use and usefulness.
Another possible factor that impacted participants’ PEOU and led to its
significant improvement are the changes in the feedback process between two
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experiments. In Experiment 1 the public discussion of groups’ deliverables was
at will and it might happened that not all groups decided to use their possibil-
ity to discuss the work. Besides the discussion in the class, each group received
individual feedback on the mistakes of method application found in their deliver-
ables. In contrast, in Experiment 2 we allocated 15 min slots and asked groups
to register for the open feedback session in advance. Each group participated in
at least one feedback session and gave a 5 min presentation on the intermediate
results. Besides the discussion by groups, for each deliverable we provided groups
with the summary of the typical problems in the application of both methods.
Moreover, in Experiment 2 we provided feedback on typical mistakes that the
participants did in the warm-up SRA of a toy application scenario that was a
part of the training. So, the groups were able to better understand the methods
and avoid mistakes from the very first deliverable. In Experiment 1 such feedback
on the warm-up exercise was not provided. We could expect that these changes
would also result in a significant increase of tabular method’s PEOU, but this
method has simpler process and representation requiring less effort to master
comparing to the graphical method. Therefore, tabular method’s PEOU did not
significantly increase in the second experiment.
The results of retrospective analysis of the previous experiments supports
the current findings. In [10] graphical and tabular methods have similar PEOU
and PU as graphical and tabular methods have clear process. In contrast, in [9]
the graphical method has higher PEOU than the tabular one because graphical
method has significantly clearer process comparing to the tabular method.
The answer to RQ2 is: if there is no fit between SRA components (i.e. method,
catalogues, and application scenario) and methods have equally clear processes
then there will be no difference in perceived efficacy of these methods. However, if
a method a) operates same concepts and terminology as an application scenario,
and/or b) has very clear process, then it may result in a better perceived efficacy
for this method comparing to the other methods.
8 Threats to Validity
In this section we discuss the main types of threats to validity [32].
Regarding internal validity, the main concern is that the relations between
the treatment and the outcome are causal and the effects of possible factors are
either controlled or measured. To mitigate this we randomly assigned groups to
the order of methods application. The results of two experiments were reported
and discussed separately to alleviate the possible effect of the differences in
experiments execution. The results of KW test did not reveal any statistically
significant effect of participants’ background and experience on the results.
The main threats to construct validity are the definition and interpretation
of the metrics that we used to measure the theoretical constructs. We measured
the actual efficacy of a method as the quality of threats and security controls
identified using a method. The relevance of results quality for an SRA is dis-
cussing in Section 3. To measure the perceived efficacy we designed the post-task
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questionnaires following TAM [31]. The questionnaire includes 8 questions about
PEOU and 9 questions about PU, which were adapted from [10,9].
A main threat to conclusion validity is related to low statistical significance
of the findings. The effect size for the equivalence test was set to δ = ±0.6
which corresponds to 20% difference in actual or perceived efficacy. The practical
meaning of this threshold is discussed in Section 3.
In regard to external validity, the main issues threatening the generaliz-
ability of the results are the use of students instead of practitioners and the use
of simple scenarios to apply the methods under evaluation [36]. The use of MSc
students in empirical studies is still question of debate. However, some studies
have argued that students perform as well as professionals [37,38]. Regarding
the use of simple scenarios, in our studies we mitigated this threat by asking the
participants to analyze two new operational scenarios introduced in the ATM
domain.
9 Conclusion
In our previous studies [10,9] with a similar settings, i.e. full-scale application
of tabular and graphical methods, the results did not reveal consistent superi-
ority of one method in identification of threats and/or controls. However, the
graphical method was reported to have higher perception than the tabular one.
The possible explanation could be that we were looking for the difference be-
tween two methods without defining how big the difference should be in order
to be different, which is not envisaged by the hypothesis tests like Wilcoxon and
Mann-Whitney.
Instead, in this study we decided to investigate how similar are security meth-
ods with respect to actual and perceived efficacy. The difference range we defined
in terms of δ = ±20%. For example, for 5-item Likert scale for quality/perception
value the δ is equal to ±0.6. It means, for example, that tabular and graphical
methods are equivalent in terms of threats quality if |Q(Tgraph)−Q(Ttab| < δ.
The results of the two controlled experiments revealed that tabular and
graphical methods are equivalent in terms of actual efficacy (RQ1). The groups
were able to identify threats and controls of a fair quality with both methods.
Regarding the difference in methods’ perception (RQ2), the data analysis
results showed that participants perceived tabular method to be slightly better
with respect to perceived ease of use and usefulness than the graphical one in
the first experiments, and in the second experiment the two methods were found
to be statistically equivalent with respect to perception variables.
To summarize, the study shows that tabular and graphical methods for (se-
curity) requirements elicitation and risk assessment are very similar with respect
to actual and perceived efficacy. Graphical representation only does not guar-
antee the better quality of security requirements analysis in comparison to a
tabular method.
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